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Abstract 
Although emerging market Asian economies have experienced high growth without 
crises for close to a decade, many commentators find the large buildup of foreign 
exchange reserves among these economies both puzzling and evidence of incipient 
global imbalances.  This paper reviews some of the experience of Asian countries 
over the last decade. We focus on the degree to which Asian economies have 
experienced financial globalization, meaning that their gross external asset and 
liability positions have grown significantly. In particular, while Asian economies have 
become significant gross creditors in bonds and other fixed income assets, their 
liability position in equity and FDI assets has also grown significantly. We show that 
a simple dynamic general equilibrium model of portfolio choice in an emerging 
market economy can account for this trend remarkably well. 
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 1 Introduction
Since the crises of the late 1990￿ s, the major emerging Asian economies have experienced
close to a decade of uninterrupted growth. Capital ￿ ows from industrial countries in the
form of FDI as well as portfolio and bond investment have been strong, while on aggregate,
Asian countries have been generating strong current account surpluses with the rest of
the world. . Sovereign spreads have been low by historic standards for a number of
years. In addition, these countries have to a signi￿cant extent eliminated their ￿nancial
vulnerabilities displayed so clearly during the crisis years by correcting the currency and
maturity mismatches in their national balance sheets. Some countries have abandoned
tight exchange rate pegs and moved towards ￿ exible in￿ ation targeting. More generally,
the quality of policy-making in the ￿scal and ￿nancial domain has improved greatly.
There is no single explanation for this positive trend among Asian emerging market
economies. High global saving has led to a prolonged period of low real interest rates,
reducing the potential for crises. The buildup of strong positive net external positions
as well as large stocks of foreign exchange rate reserves has had the same e⁄ect, and
more generally has instilled a strong con￿dence in the investment potential of these coun-
tries. But in addition, real economic growth has been stimulated by high demand for
exports from the industrial world (in particular the US), and commodity prices booms
have generated huge net gains for many emerging countries.
One general feature of emerging economies recent experience that di⁄ers from previous
episodes of high capital in￿ ows and economic growth is the degree to which they have been
participants in the globalization of ￿nancial markets. Rather than simply being recipients
of net capital in￿ ows or out￿ ows, many emerging countries have displayed growth in gross
external ￿nancial assets and liabilities that are much larger than net positions. In this
sense, their experience mirrors that of many advanced economies, as documented in the
seminal work of Lane and Milesi Ferretti (2001, 2005, 2006). Although recent discussion of
global imbalances has mostly concentrated on the size of net external surpluses of China
and other emerging economies, re￿ ecting the apparently perverse situation of capital
out￿ ows from the developing world to developed economies (or more accurately, the US),
in the background there is a large degree of two way capital ￿ ow. Emerging economies have
been accumulating large stocks of US treasury bills going into o¢ cial reserve and other
￿xed income assets, but they have also been receiving large in￿ ows of FDI and portfolio
1equity investment, as well as private bond market in￿ ows. Lane and Milesi Ferretti (2006)
document this turnaround on the portfolio position of emerging market economies taken
as a whole. From the situation in the mid 1990￿ s, where many of these economies were
substantial net debtors in non-contingent assets such as bank loans and short term US
dollar bonds, now they have substantial net positive positions in ￿xed income assets,
while being on the whole net debtors in FDI and portfolio equity investment. There is
an argument that this is in fact a much more e¢ cient form of ￿nancing development
lending for emerging market economies, in terms of achieving the most desired degree of
international sharing risk.
This paper investigates the impact of ￿nancial globalization in emerging market economies,
paying particular attention to the determinants of country portfolio positions. We explore
the factors underlying the determinants of an optimal risk-sharing portfolio for an emerg-
ing market economy that needs to attract investment capital, but experiences country
speci￿c macroeconomic risk. This loosely approximates the positions of the fast-growing
Asian exporting economies. The question is, how should investment be ￿nanced? One
possibility is for these countries to borrow substantially in the form of non-contingent
foreign bank loans, or international bond markets in order to ￿nance their own invest-
ment. In the mid 1990￿ s, this could roughly describe the ￿nancing patterns of many
emerging economies. Another option however is to accept FDI and equity investment. As
we noted, this is becoming more the norm for emerging economies in recent years. In our
analysis, we interpret this ￿nancing choice as an implication of ￿nancial globalization. In
an environment where emerging market economies can avail of a more enhanced menu of
international asset markets, an optimal ￿nancing pattern is to accept in￿ ows of FDI and
portfolio investment, but balance this with out￿ ows of investment in ￿xed income, non-
contingent assets. This o⁄ers one way to interpret the build-up of international reserve
assets on the part of emerging economies.
Our analysis is built around a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the
interaction between an emerging market economy and the rest of the world. We fol-
low Devereux and Saito (2007) in constructing a stochastic continuous time framework
with incomplete markets 1. Our results indicate that ￿nancial globalization, wherein an
1There has been a rapid growth in the literature on incorporating portfolio dynamics in DSGE models.
See Devereux and Sutherland (2006, 2007), Engel and Matsumoto, 2005, Evans and Hnaktkovska, 2005,
and Tille and Van Wincoop, 2007, among other papers, for alternative approaches.
2emerging market economy may simultaneously build up positive gross positions in non-
contingent international bond assets, and negative positions in FDI and portfolio equity,
o⁄ers both welfare bene￿ts and a more stable form of ￿nancing than that available in the
mid 1990￿ s. In the model, the emerging economy holds nominal bonds of the advanced
economy, while issuing FDI-equity claims which are held by the advanced economy. We
interpret nominal bond holdings as a measure of foreign exchange reserves. The model
delivers explicit solutions for the value of FDI, foreign exchange reserves, and total bond
holdings in emerging market portfolios. The FDI position depends upon expected returns
in the emerging market, as well as growth risk in both the advanced economy and the
emerging market. Foreign exchange rate reserves depend on expected returns, and growth
volatility in the emerging market, as well as in the advanced economy. In addition, foreign
exchange rate reserve holdings are sensitive to the monetary policy followed by advanced
economies. If the advanced economy follows a very stable volatility of monetary policy,
this will signi￿cantly boost emerging market foreign exchange rate reserves. At the same
time, a rise in the riskiness of the domestic income process in emerging markets will lead
to an increase in foreign reserve holdings.
Although the model is extremely rudimentary, we argue that it can give a coherent ac-
count of the portfolio structure of emerging market Asian economies. The recent buildup
in foreign exchange rate reserves in Asian countries can be rationalized as a response to ob-
served movements in macroeconomic volatility in Asia and advanced industrial economies.
In particular, a combination of a) higher volatility of GDP in Asian countries, b) a lower
volatility of GDP in advanced economies, and c) a fall in the volatility of in￿ ation in the
US (more stable US dollar price level) all work together to increase foreign exchange rate
reserve holdings in Asia. A simple calibration to the US China case leads to a remarkably
close ￿t between model and data.
One quali￿cation that should be noted is that the paper is not primarily focused on
current account imbalances, or the size of net capital ￿ ows. Rather, we wish to explore the
determinants of gross capital ￿ ows and the structure of the external portfolio positions
for emerging market economies. Although our model does allow for current account
imbalances, it can account for a trend in the current account only by allowing for trend
di⁄erences in savings rates. To jointly account for the scale of global imbalances and the
3shifting portfolio composition without arbitrary di⁄erences in savings propensities would
require a more elaborate model than that developed here.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses some recent features
of Asian external imbalances and portfolio composition. Section 3 presents a review of
recent literature on global imbalances and Asian reserve holdings. Section 4 develops the
model and presents a simple quantitative analysis. Some conclusions follows.
2 Asian External Balance and Portfolio Structure
We focus on a subset of emerging market countries in Asia. The growing current account
surpluses of Asian countries is to a large degree the counterpart to the US current account
de￿cit. For many emerging Asian countries, these current account surpluses date back
to the Asian crisis of the late 1990￿ s. A large empirical and theoretical literature has
attempted to provide an explanation for these surpluses.
Figure 1 describes the evolution of current account to GDP ratios for a number of
Asian countries. All countries are currently in current account surplus, but this masks
distinct di⁄erences in their historical record. The fast growing East Asian Tigers, Korea,
Malaysia, Thailand, and to a lesser extent Taiwan, all experienced signi￿cant net capital
in￿ ows in the early 1990￿ s, but were hit strongly by ￿ sudden stops￿during the Asian crisis
of 1997-98. Their current accounts swung sharply back into a surplus position. Indonesia
had a similar experience. By contrast, China experienced net capital in￿ ow only for one
year in the 1990￿ s. It was relatively immune to the direct e⁄ects of the Asian crisis. In
fact its current account to GDP position deteriorated somewhat during this period. For
the past ￿ve years however, all countries have experienced strong surpluses. In particular,
China￿ s current account surplus grew sharply in 2005 to nearly 7 percent of GDP.
Figure 2 breaks down the current account position into national saving and invest-
ment rates, relative to GDP. For Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, the current account
improvement after the Asian crisis is substantially explained by a dramatic fall in invest-
ment, with a relatively stable savings rate. Taiwan started with a substantially lower
savings and investment rate than the other Asian countries, but then had a surge in its
savings and a fall in investment after the Asian crisis. For China, both investment and
savings rates are quite stable in the late 1990￿ s, but show a distinct increase after 2002.
4The absolute savings rate in China is a remarkable 45 percent, but this is also true for
Malaysia. The key di⁄erence between China and the other East Asian countries lies in
the levels of investment. China has investment levels similar to those of the Asian Tigers
in the mid-1990￿ s - above 40 percent of GDP, while the latter countries have converged
down to investment rates in the 20 to 30 percent of GDP range, comparable to those of
the advanced economies. A similar pattern is shown in the comparative growth rates
among countries (not shown). Growth rates in the Asian tiger economies fell sharply after
1997, but recovered quickly. Subsequent growth rates however were lower than those of
the early 1990￿ s, and in the range of the growth rates of the US in the recent past. By
contrast, China￿ s growth rate increased in the early 2000￿ s to the 9-10 percent range.
Figure 3, based on the ￿ External Wealth of Nations￿database of Lane and Milesi
Ferretti (2006) (LMF). It shows the level of gross assets and gross liabilities to GDP,
following the measurement adjustments made in LMF. For the period since 1990, all
countries have been net debtors except for Taiwan, which is a substantial net creditor,
although China￿ s NFA also turned slightly positive in 2002. Net Foreign Assets for China
and Korea is a relatively small share of GDP, while Malaysia and Thailand have higher
net debt positions. Although valuation adjustment through equity prices and exchange
rates in LMF break the direct link between the current account and NFA, all countries
have exhibited an increase in NFA in the current decade.
Note that Figure 3 emphasizes that all the countries have substantial gross positions
on each side. In particular, China and Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan have experienced
substantial ￿ ￿nancial globalization￿ , in the sense that both gross assets and gross liabilities
have approximately doubled, as a proportion of GDP, since the early 1990￿ s. Indonesia
and Thailand di⁄er somewhat. They have had a substantial increase in the gross asset
to GDP ratio in the current decade, but liabilities were substantially higher in the mid-
1990￿ s, well over 100 percent of GDP for both countries, and have come down considerably
since then.
Figure 4 illustrate the composition of gross foreign assets and gross foreign liabilities
between equity and debt instruments. Here, debt instruments include o¢ cial reserve
assets and portfolio debt. Equity includes FDI and portfolio equity. The Figure shows
that on the asset side, for all countries, the biggest fraction is in debt instruments, with
only a small portion in equity and FDI instruments. Figure 4 also highlights a less well
5known aspect of recent portfolio behavior for Asian economies. The composition of gross
external liabilities has switched strongly towards an increasing share of equity and FDI.
For China, at the beginning of the sample, seventy percent of external liabilities were
in debt instruments, and only 30 percent were in equity instruments. By the end of
the sample, this proportion had been exactly reversed. Korea had an equally dramatic
increase in the share of liabilities attributed to equity. A similar, though less strong
turnaround is seen in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Taiwan.
Figure 5 shows that o¢ cial reserves constitute a growing share of total assets in the
current decade, rising to an astonishing 67 percent of total gross assets for China in 2004.
This huge holding of low yielding assets (mostly in US dollar treasury bills), has led to
an increasing debate in the economics literature over the last number of years.
3 Explaining Asian External Balances
Two strong features of the data come out of the previous section. First, and most promi-
nantly, all Asian countries generated large current account surpluses following the Asian
crisis, and these have persisted over the last 7 or 8 years. Secondly, most countries have
also had substantial growth in both gross assets and liabilities, and had distinct changes
in their national balance sheet composition, generating large stocks on foreign exchange
rate reserves on the asset side, and a substantial growth in the share of equity and FDI
on the liability side.
What explains the huge Asian surpluses in this decade? This question has generated
a huge literature over the last few years. A number of alternative accounts have been
presented. One view is that the persistent current account surpluses represent a form of
hedging or precautionary saving against the possibility of future ￿ sudden stops￿ , or abrupt
cut-o⁄s from access to capital markets. Caballero and Panageas (2005) develop a model
of a small open economy subject to a risk of sudden stops, and examine the behavior
of saving under a variety of alternative possibilities for hedging sudden stop risk. They
note that saving is higher in an economy with the risk of sudden stops. Jeanne and
Ranciere (2006) and Jeanne (2007) interpret the buildup in foreign exchange reserves in
Asian economies as a form of collective insurance against sudden stops, where the public
sector has an advantage in providing resources to smooth out the consumption e⁄ects of
6sudden stops. Mendoza et al. (2007) develop a model of precautionary saving in response
to non-insurable idiosyncratic income risk, and show that it can account for substantial
foreign exchange reserve accumulation of the kind seen in the data. They argue that
either ￿nancial liberalization or hedging against sudden stops can provide an explanation
for the recent growth in emerging market market exchange rate reserves.
One problem with these theories of precautionary saving is that they all work on the
savings side, and therefore do not provide an adequate explanation for one of the main
features apparent in Figure 2; that a large part of the Asian current account expansion
can be attributed to a fall in investment, rather than a rise in savings. As we noted, for
Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand, current account surpluses were substantially driven by an
investment collapse, with savings relatively unchanged. An alternative model of ￿ global
imbalances￿ , developed in Caballero et al. (2007), attributes the joint process of savings
and investment in emerging markets as a result of the absence of ￿nancial markets by
which savings may be converted into pro￿table assets. They argue that a key feature
of emerging economies is an ￿ asset shortage￿ . Even though these economies may have
high growth rates, real domestic returns may be low because of the absence of adequate
instruments for saving, leading them to invest in advanced economies, which can o⁄er
a supply of assets unavailable in emerging markets. Caballero et al (2007) show that
such ￿nancial distortions in emerging markets can explain why such countries could run
current account surpluses with advanced economies. Moreover they show that the same
￿nancial distortions may lead to low rates of investment in emerging economies.
Relatively few commentators have focused on the nature of two-way capital ￿ ows
between emerging markets and advanced economies. Dooley et al. (2007) argue that
emerging market current account surpluses represent a collatoral payment for the risk of
FDI in emerging markets, but do not o⁄er an explicit model of this process. Wei and
Ju (2007) argue that there is a ￿ by-pass￿process of capital ￿ ows, whereby informational
imperfections in ￿nancial markets in emerging economies make it desirable for residents
to invest in advanced economies and then receive FDI from these economies. Neither of
these papers however takes a general equilibrium portfolio approach, as is done here. We
now turn to the explicit portfolio model.
74 A Portfolio Model of Reserve Accumulation
In this section we develop a simple dynamic portfolio model to determine the joint de-
termination of optimal reserve holdings and FDI accumulation. The model is adapted
from Devereux and Saito (2007). There is an advanced economy and an emerging market
economy. There is a single world good, which can be consumed or invested by agents in
each country. Two structural features di⁄erentiate the advanced economy (home) from
the emerging market economy (foreign). In the advanced economy there is a single risky
technology for producing output, while in the emerging economy (foreign) there are two
risky technologies, which we could think of as a ￿ traditional￿and a ￿ modern￿sector. In-
vestors in the home country can invest in the modern sector of the foreign country. We
refer to this as FDI investment. The second key distinction between the two economies
concerns the form of international traded assets. We assume that bonds denominated in
the home country currency (e.g. the ￿ dollar￿ ) are traded between countries, but there is no
trade in foreign currency denominated bonds. This captures the empirical feature world
bond markets are still overwhelmingly dominated by a few major currency denominations,
with the US dollar overwhelmingly still being the dominant acceptable denomination. In
the model, foreign holdings of home currency bonds are de￿ned as foreign exchange re-
serves of the foreign country. The equilibrium of the model may be used to illustrate the
joint dynamics of home country FDI and foreign exchange reserve accumulation of the
foreign country. The di⁄erence between the two determine the evolution of the foreign
countries net foreign assets.
4.1 The Model
The model is explained in more detail in Devereux and Saito (2007), so we give just a
very brief description here. In the home country there is a risky linear technology which
uses capital and generates expected instantaneous return ￿D with standard deviation ￿D.
In the foreign country, there are two technologies; a traditional and a modern technology,
with returns ￿T, ￿M and standard deviations ￿T, ￿M respectively. Capital can be turned
into consumption without any cost. The return on the home technology (in terms of the
homogeneous good) is given by:
dQi
Qi
= ￿Ddt + ￿DdB; (1)
8where dB is the increment to a standard Weiner process. For simplicity, we assume that
the returns on all three technologies are independent, and that the covariances between
dB, dB￿
T, and dB￿
M are all zero.
International ￿nancial markets are incomplete. This is captured by the fact that
foreign country residents cannot directly purchase shares in the technology of the home
country, and home residents can only buy shares in the modern sector of the foreign
country (FDI). Again, we don￿ t explicitly endogenize this constraint, but we see it as
re￿ ecting the inability of residents of large emerging market countries such as China to
directly invest in external equity markets. We do however allow for trade in the home
currency nominal bond, and a real risk-free bond.
Nominal bonds are denominated in home currency by assumption. Although nominal
bonds are risk-free in dollar terms, their real returns are subject to in￿ ation risk. Home
country in￿ ation is modeled as follows
dPi
Pi
= ￿dt + vdM:
Thus, in￿ ation has mean ￿i and standard deviation v. dM represents the increment
to a standard Weiner process. We assume that dM and dB have covariance given by
the parameter ￿, but dB￿
T and dB￿
M are independent of dM. Hence, ￿ will be a critical
parameter, capturing the way in which returns on nominal bonds co-vary with real returns
on the home technology. If ￿ < 0; as most of our discussion below presumes, then real
bond returns are pro-cyclical. We discuss the evidence for this assumption below.
Let the instantaneous nominal return on currency i bonds be b Ri. Then the real return
on bond i is
(Ri ￿ ￿i)dt ￿ vidMi;
where Ri = b Ri +v2
i is an adjusted nominal interest rate. This will be determined endoge-
nously as part of the world bond market equilibrium.
The budget constraint for the home country may be written as:
dW = W [!D(￿D ￿ r) + !N(Rh ￿ ￿h ￿ r) + !M(￿M ￿ r) + r]dt (2)
￿Cdt + W (!T￿DdB ￿ !nvdM + !M￿MdBM);
where W is home country wealth, and !D, !N, and !M are the portfolio shares, re-
spectively, of the domestic technology, home currency nominal bonds, and FDI. Hence,
1 ￿ !D ￿ !N ￿ !M represents the share of the real risk-free bond.
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where ￿ is the rate of time preference.
4.2 Optimal Consumption and Portfolio Rules
With logarithmic utility, consumers follow the myopic consumption rule:
C = ￿W; C
￿ = ￿W
￿:





































































4.3 Asset Market Equilibrium
At any moment in time, an equilibrium in the market for nominal bonds determines the
nominal rates of return Rh. The nominal bond market clearing condition requires that




￿ = 0; (7)
10Note that the assumption here is that home currency nominal bonds are in zero world
net supply. We could explicitly model a ￿scal agency that issues home currency bonds,
but this would have no impact on the equilibrium foreign holdings of these bonds.
We have also allowed for trade in a real, indexed bond, again in zero net world supply.
The market clearing condition for the real bond is described as:







￿ = 0: (8)
Using (5), these two conditions may be solved for R and r. De￿ne ￿ = W￿
W￿+W as the
ratio of foreign wealth to world wealth. To simplify the presentation, we will assume for
the rest of this section that ￿T = ￿M and ￿T = ￿M. That is, the two sectors in the
emerging market country have identical returns and volatilities. Then we can derive the
solutions:
R(￿) = Z(￿)RD + (1 ￿ Z(￿))RM; (9)
r(￿) = H(￿)rD + (1 ￿ H(￿))rM: (10)
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M . Here RD (RM) denotes the equilibrium nominal return on home
currency bonds when the home (foreign) country is arbitrarily wealthy, i.e. ￿ ! 1 (￿ ! 0),
and Z(￿) is a function of parameters and ￿ such that Z(0) = 1; and Z(1) = 0. Likewise,
rD (rM) denotes the equilibrium risk-free return when the home (foreign) country is
arbitrarily wealthy, i.e. ￿ ! 1 (￿ ! 0), where H(￿) is a function of parameters and ￿
such that H(0) = 1; and H(1) = 0.
Thus, solutions (9) and (10) indicate that the equilibrium world nominal and real rates
of return are time-varying weighted averages of the rates of return that would hold were
either country to become arbitrarily large, and the weights depend on the relative size
of each country in world wealth. Note that RD is a function of both home and foreign
technology parameters, because home country residents can invest directly in the foreign
technogy, while RM depends only on the foreign technology. In addition, because home
in￿ ation is independent of foreign technology, RM is independent of ￿ and v. On the other
hand, for values of ￿D t ￿M and ￿ < 0, we have RD > rD. This is because for ￿ < 0,
the real return on the home currency bond covaries positively with the home portfolio.
11In order for home agents to hold the home currency bond, it must pay a higher rate of
return than rD.




2) > 0. Then we can compute the equilibrium home country
FDI holding as:
e !D =





The FDI share of the portfolio is increasing in the return on the foreign modern sector,
but decreasing in the volatility of this sector. FDI is also a⁄ected by the volatility of the
home sector. When ￿D t ￿M, an increase in ￿2
D increases FDI, but this may be reversed
when ￿M > ￿D.
Using (9) and (10), we may also compute the share of reserves and risk-free bonds in
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For ￿D t ￿M and ￿ < 0, foreign exchange reserves are always positive, but holdings
of risk-free real bonds may be positive or negative. The total holdings of bonds (the sum
of risk-free bonds and nominal bonds) is positive when ￿D t ￿M and .￿2
M t ￿2
D.
What determines demand for reserves? From (12), total reserve holdings are negatively
related to the excess return on the foreign technology,￿M ￿￿D, and negatively related to
the volatility of in￿ ation in the home country, v. When ￿D t ￿M, demand for reserves is
increasing in the volatility of the foreign technology, ￿2
M.
Note that both FDI, reserve holdings, and overall bond holdings will be time-varying,
moving as the share of the foreign country in world wealth changes. The dynamics of ￿
are determined by variations in relative wealth levels, driven by the budget constraints
(2) and (3) in combination with each country￿ s saving and portfolio allocation decisions2.
To illustrate this process, take the special case where ￿D = ￿M and ￿2
M = ￿2
D. Then
2Devereux and Saito (2007) discuss the conditions for the stability of the ￿ process.


















In this case, equilibrium FDI holdings are independent of the return and volatility of
technology risk in each country, and depend only on ￿ and ￿. For a given value of ￿; FDI
is declining in the absolute value of ￿. This is because having a short position in home
currency bonds allows some risk sharing for the home country, (when ￿ < 0) which acts
as a substitute for investing in foreign FDI.
In the symmetric case of (14) and (15), total reserve holdings are higher, the greater
is technology volatility. Reserves are increasing in (the absolute value of) ￿. As ￿ rises
in absolute value, home currency bonds become a better hedging asset for the foreign
country.
How do FDI and foreign exchange reserves depend on ￿? From (15), the relationship
between ￿ and the FDI share is non-monotonic. For very low values of ￿, indicating that
the home country is relatively wealthy, the foreign country has a high share in FDI, while
when ￿ is in an intermediate range, this share is somewhat lower. Foreign exchange
reserve holdings are negatively related to ￿. When the home country is very large, foreign
exchange reserves are a large fraction of the foreign portfolio of the foreign country. These
diminish as the foreign country wealth rises.
The foreign country has a gross asset position equal to (e !
￿
N + e !
￿
R)W ￿, its total bond
claims against the home country, and a gross liability position equal to e !DW, the FDI
holding of the home country. We can then de￿ne net foreign assets of the foreign country,
relative to world wealth, as nfa= (e !
￿
N + e !
￿
R)￿ ￿ e !D(1￿￿). Using the above solutions we
obtain
nfa = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿




(1 + ￿) + ￿2
M￿
￿
This may be positive or negative. Net foreign assets are higher, the higher is the return
on the home technology relative to the foreign technology, and the higher is the volatility
of the foreign technology, but lower, the higher is the volatility of the foreign technology.
Again, net foreign assets will be time-varying in response to movements in ￿.
13Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between ￿ and net foreign assets of the foreign
country. The dynamics of ￿ are driven by relative growth rates and the underlying tech-
nology shocks of the two countries. For a low ￿, the foreign country is relatively poor, and
it is a net debtor, as the value of its FDI liabilities is large relative to its external bond
holdings. As ￿ rises, this situation is reversed, as it builds up a large nominal and real
bond claim on the rest of the world. As ￿ tends to unity, the foreign country would be-
come dominant in the world economy, and its net foreign assets, relative to world wealth,
would trend to zero3.
4.4 Quantitative Assessment
For the general case, Table 1 provides a rough quantitative assessment of the size of FDI,
foreign exchange rate reserve holdings, and total bond holdings implied by the model. For
this calculation we use the following calibration, based partially on US data. Assume that
the real risk-free rate of return on capital is 6 percent, approximately the long run return to
equity in the US economy. The average real GDP growth rate of consumption since 1980
is approximately three percent, with a standard deviation of 1.7 percent. In a symmetric
steady state, the real risk-free interest rate is ￿ ￿ ￿
2
2, and the expected consumption
growth rate is ￿￿ ￿
2
2￿￿. Setting ￿ = 0:017, ￿￿ ￿
2
2 = 0:06 and ￿￿ ￿
2
2￿￿ = 0:03 requires
that ￿ = 0:0601 and ￿ = :0301. The volatility of US in￿ ation since 1980 is 1.3 percent,
which guides our choice of v = 0:013: For the foreign country, we assume that ￿ and ￿ are
the same as the US, but we assume a more volatile GDP process, setting ￿M;= 0:03, to
match China￿ s GDP volatility over the 1980-2004 perdiod. In addition, we set ￿ = 0:5 for
the baseline case. Finally, a value of ￿ = ￿0:6 is used, following the estimate of Kydland




3The long run mean of ￿ will be determined by the underlying parameters and volatility of technologies
and the in￿ ation rate process.
14Table 1 Assets and liabilities relative to GDP
FDI liabilities Reserve Assets Bonds Assets NFA
Data 0.33 0.37 0.39 0.08
Baseline 0.29 0.38 0.41 0.06
High ￿M 0.21 0.47 0.59 0.19
Low v 0.29 0.57 0.41 0.06
Low ￿D 0.14 0.31 0.71 0.29
Table 1 measures the share of GDP held in each portfolio category. We compare this
to the measured shares of equity and FDI liabilities, reserve assets, total bond assets,
and net foreign assets for China in 2004, obtained from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006).
The baseline case in fact does a remarkably good job at matching the observed asset
and liability positions of China. The implied reserve to GDP ratio is 38 percent, almost
exactly that in the data, and the FDI-equity to GDP ratio is 29 percent, very close to
the observed 33 percent in the data. The total bond assets-GDP ratio is 41 percent in
the model, and 39 percent in the data, while the overall NFA in the model is 6 percent,
slightly less than the 8 percent in the data.
Table 1 also reports the implications of a higher volatility of foreign technology, and a
lower volatility of home country technology, as well as a lower volatility of home country
in￿ ation. An increase in ￿M increases reserves, bond holdings, and NFA, while decreasing
FDI holdings of the home country. Intuitively, a rise in ￿M increases the demand for home
country ￿xed income assets, reducing the rate of return R and reducing the equilibrium
FDI holdings of the home country. A fall in v leads to a substitution out of real indexed
bonds towards nominal bonds for the foreign country, while leaving FDI, overall bond
holdings, and NFA unchanged. Finally, a fall in ￿D leads to a fall in FDI, and a rise in
reserves, real bond holdings, and NFA of the foreign country.
In summary, the model implies that a growth in reserve holdings of emerging market
countries might be attributed to a) a rise in volatility of emerging markets, b) a fall in the
volatility of in￿ ation in advanced economies, or c) a fall in GDP volatility in advanced
countries. In each case, there is a rise in reserve holdings of emerging economies, as well
as a rise in the NFA position of these countries.
In summary, we may conclude that in terms of accounting for the qualitative and to
some extent quantitative features of portfolio shares for emerging market economies, a
15simple model driven by aggregate macroeconomic risk alone is reasonably successful.
5 Conclusions
Emerging market economies in Asia have experienced a remarkable episode of high and
stable economic growth during the current decade. One view is that this stability is
generated by these countries persistent current account surplus positions and the implicit
￿ hedging￿potential that this provides against sudden stops. In this paper, we have empha-
sized a di⁄erent mechanism, based on portfolio diversi￿cation principles and the growth
of equity based ￿nancing of Asian investment. A simple portfolio allocation model can
provide an interpretation of this phenomenon. A complete explation of gross and net
capital ￿ ows in Asian economies however would combining this model with an account of
the high savings rates in Asia. We leave this for future research.
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